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The BAROMETER is a student bi-weekly newspaper for the 
exchange of ideas and information concerning the development 
and improvement of the professional environment at the 
Naval Postgraduate School. Items of interest, papers, 
and articles of interest to the students, staff, and faculty 
as a whole are solicited by the editors. 
"There is nothing in the world more soft and weak than water, 
yet for attacking things that are firm and strong, nothing 
surpasses it." Lao Tze, flo 6th century B.C. 
EDITORS COMMENT: As everyone is supposed to know, one of the primary missions of the 
U.S. Navy is strategic deterrence - a task it shares with the Air Force. COL Clinton 
H. WINNE, Jr., expresses his views on the effect of the SALT agreements upon the status 
of "the synergy of the TRIAD." We found his assessment of the SALT agreements viable, 
and our readers may find his conclusions "interesting". COL WINNE is Deputy Commander 
for operations, 456 Bombardment Wing, Beale AFB, Ca. He has served as a strategic force 
planner at HQ, USAF, Air Staff and Joint Staff. He is a graduate of the Air War College. 
The feature article comes from the September-October issue of the Air University Review. 
FEATURE ARTICLE: SALT AND THE BLUE-WATER STRATEGY 
"Over the past few years, there has been increasing discussion of a so-called 'Blue-
Water Strategy' Several articles have appeared in the general press as well as in Service-
oriented magazines concerning the subject. This article will examine one feature of the 
proposed strategy-moving our nuclear deterrent to sea-to determine how it is affected by 
the recently concluded Arms Limitation agreements. 
An article that appeared in THE NATION in November 1970 discussed 'the adoption of the 
Blue-Water option, which would rely solely on sea-based missiles and eliminate vulnerable 
land-based ICBMs and manned bombers.' In the April 1971 issued of UNITED STATES NAVAL 
INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS an article advocated 'increasing the movement of the strategic deterrent 
to sea while there is still time.' Why? 'Because the inexorable advance of technology 
in both the United States and the Soviet Union is making all fixed, land-based deterrent 
systems vulnerable, obsolete and highly risky and tempting for pre-emptive attack.' The 
author further recommended immediate deployment of between 300 and 400 Minuteman missiles 
at sea aboard specially designed or modified missile ships. He also recommended the 
phase-out of land-based strategic bombers and an increase in the strategic delivery 
~ capability of attack aircraft carriers. Then, in the December 1971 issue of SEA POWER, 
Rear Admiral George H. Miller proposed a new national strategy that stressed movement of 
more of our nuclear deterrent, as well as general purpose military power to sea. 
These authors are proposing that the 'blue-water' strategy or option be applied both 
to general purpose forces and to the nuclear deterrent at sea. This article, however, will 
deal only with the latter aspect of the blue-water strategy, since it is more directly 
related to the agreements uunder the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Although SALT 
may eventually have an indirect impatt In planning general purpose forces, possibly as in 
such matters as freeing Some money that would otherwise have been spent on strategic forces, 
the extent of the impact is not evident at this time. 
CREDIBILITY OF THE BLUE-WATER STRATEGY 
It is evident that, even prior to the SALT agreements, most defense planners did not 
accept a strategy that would place complete reliance on only one element of our nuclear 
deterrent. Most students of defense planning also saw the obvious flaws in this strategy 
of placing 'all our eggs in one basket.' AIR FORCE MAGAZINE, in a March 1972 editorial, 
-2-
exposed the dangers of this strategy very well. It is not the purpose here to reiterate 
these arguments. However, it is evident that we must maintain the strength of all three 
elements of our strategic deterrent: land-based missiles, sea-based missiles, and bombers. 
In his ANNUAL DEFENSE DEPARTMENT REPORT FY 1973, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird stated: 
'Turning to specifics in our planning, although each elements of our strategic offensive 
face at the present time possesses a substantial capability in its own right, we plan to 
maintain a combination of land and sea-based missiles and manned bombers during the program 
period. This will enable us to take advantage of the unique capabilities inherent in these 
different systems, to provide a hedge against enemy technological breakthroughs or unforeseen 
operational failures, either of which might adversely affect our deterrent, and to complicate 
Soviet and PRC (People's Republic of China) offensive and defensive strategic planning.' 
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas H. Mooerer, in his MILITARY 
POSTURE REPORT FOR FY 1973, lent further support to the need for a mix of strategic 
offensive forces with this statement: 'In this connection, I want to state once again the 
firm convicition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that an appropriate mix of mutually supporting 
strategic forces is still essential to the maintenance of our deterrent.' 
Programs to continue this strategic mix, including an option to increase the numbers of 
Minuteman III in the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force, were advanced by 
the Administration in FY 74 budget requests. 
In spite of arguments against relying solely on a sea-based nuclear deterrent, it is 
unlikely that we have heard the last of these proposals. For one thing, some critics of 
Defense spending see the blue-water strategy as an opportunity to cut Defense budgets 
drastically. For another, there are those who still believe in the 'assured destruction' 
theory of the early 1960s, i.e., that the capability to cause fatalities to a quarter or 
a third of the population of the Soviet Union is all that is required for deterrence. 
SALT AGREEMENTS 
Therefore, let's look at the SALT agreements to see if they support or nullify the 
arguments made by the advocates of a blue-water strategy. 
The SALT agreements consist of two principal parts: the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 
Treaty and the Interim Offensive Agreement. The ABM Treaty is of unlimited duration and 
prohibits either the Soviet Union or the United States from deploying a nationwide ABM 
defense or a base for such a defense. Each side is permitted to deploy a limited defense 
of two areas-the national capital and one ICMB complex. No more than on hundred ABM 
launchers and interceptors are permitted at each site. The Interim Offensive Agreements 
lasts for five years and permits each side to keep any fixed land-based ICBM launchers 
currently operational or under construction. Additionally, neither side may convert any 
other ICBM launchers to modern large ballistic missile launchers. Each side may keep 
any submarine-launched ballisitc missile (SLBM) launchers operational or under construction. 
Also, newer SLBM launchers may be built as replacements for older LSBM launchers or for 
older heavy ICBM lauchers. The Soviet Union is limited to 950 SLBM launchers and 62 
modern ballistic missile submarines. The United States is limited to 710 SLBM's and 44 
modern ballistic missile submarines. Bombers are not included in the agreement. 
One immediately evident impace of SALT is a freeze on the present balance of U.S. ICBM's 
and SLBM's, except that the 54 Titan II ICBM's (the only heavy U.S. missile and our only 
'older type deployed prior to 1964') could be phased out in favor of 54 additional SLBM's. 
Any reduction of the Minuteman force could not, under terms of the Protocol to the Interim 
Agreement. open the way for additional U.S. SLBM's. 
SURVIVABILITY 
Since the vulnerability of land-based missiles and bombers has been cited as the primary 
reason for moving the nuclear deterrent to sea, let's look at the effect of the SALT 
agreements on the survivability of each of the three elements. 
A potential threat to the survivability of the Minuteman force could be posed by an 
increase in the numbers. yield. and accuracy of multiple independently targetable recentry 
vehicle (MIRV) warheads on SS-9 or SS-9 type ICBM's. Admiral Moorer noted this potential 
threat as follows: 
"If these new or modified ICBMs also turn out to be MIRVed systems with significantly 
improved CEPs. the potential threat to our MINUTEMAN force. which has been of such great 
concern to us over the last few years. could become a reality. The severity of the threat. 
however. would depend on the number. accuracy. and yield of the RVs carried by the new 
missiles. Let me hasten to add that this assessment is not meant to be a forecast. It 
is simply one of the more likely possibilities which must now be taken into account. 
particularly in the absence of a meaningful agreement to limit the deployment of missiles." 
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Although the agreement does not limit the accuracy or yield of the re-entry vehicles 
(RV), it does limit the number if ICBM and SLBM launchers and the dimensions of ICBM 
launchers, and hence it indirectly limits the payload that could be deployed for a given 
level of technology (which remains unconstrained). Therefore, while the number of RV's 
allowable can be said to be indrectly limited, neither side has yet realized its full 
potential. Thus the Interim Offensive Agreement impact on the potential threat to Minutemari 
appears now to be marked by Soviet technological deve~opments. In testifying before the 
House Armed Services Committee in July 1972, Admiral Moorer provided the following 
information: 
With respect to our research and development efforts, while analyses conducted within 
DOD using Soviet force levels comparable to those constrained by SAL indicated that sufficient 
MINUTEMAN missiles would survive to accomplish a retaliatory mission, it is still necessary 
to maintain a hedge against possible Soviet qualitative improvements or abrogation of the 
agreement. 
The hedge referred to in the testimony was the site defense research and development 
'- program. From the above information, it would appear that, under SALT, the land-based 
ICBM force is still a viable part of our deterrent. Even complete vulnerability of the 
Minuteman force, unlikely as that is, would not eliminate Minuteman's deterrent value. Its 
destruction would require an enemy to expend heavily from his constrained forces, after 
which he would face the prospect of retaliation from surviving u.S. strategic force elements. 
Minuteman would continue to have detrrent value. 
Turning now to the next element of our strategic nuclear deterrent, the submarine-
launched ballistic missiles, what effect does SALT have on the survivability of this system? 
At first glance, the answer seems to be none, since Soviet antisubmarine warfare improvements 
pose the primary threat to our SLBM's and ASW systems are not included in the SALT agree-
ments. There is an indirect effect on SLBM survivability, however, in that ICBMs could 
be used to attack ballistic missile submarines if their location were known. The SALT 
agreement limits the total number of Soviet ICBM's and, therefore, could affect the 
desirability of using them for this purpose. A counter to this argument is evident in the 
large number of ICBM's the Soviets are permitted under SALT-in the neighborhood of 1500. 
Another factor is the omission of limitations on bombers. The Soviets have a large number 
of Badger medium bombers assigned to their naval forces. A technological breakthrough in 
submarine localization could facilitate the use of these Badgers against our SLBM forces. 
It should be noted, however, that solutions to the localization problem will not come 
easily. 
What about the impact of SALT on the survivability of our land-based bombers? Here 
again, the threat is a postulated one and consists of Soviet SLBM's launched against bomber 
bases with insufficient warning time to permit safe escape of the alert bombers. The 
Interim Offensive Agreement limits the number of SLBM launchers the Soviets may deploy 
but, because of the relatively large numbers permitted, does little to limit this postulated 
threat. However, other measures are being taken which will greatly reduce the threat to 
bomber bases from SLBM's, and these measures outweigh the limitations on the numbers of 
Soviet SLBM's. These measures were described by Secretary Laird in his FY 73 Defense Report 
and include: (1) dispersing the alert aircraft over a greater number of bases, generally 
farther inland than in the past; and (2) deployment of a new satellite early-warning system 
that will greatly improve the overall capability of our warning network, especially against 
SLBM launches. 
In summary, then, the Interim Offensive Agreement will probably have a favorable 
impace on the survivability of all three elements of our strategic deterrent. 
One final point should be mentioned concerning survivability. The threats that have 
been postulated against Minuteman and the bomber force have usually been considered in 
~ isolation against each component, rather than as part of a carefully considered overall plan. 
It is unlikely that a prudent Soviet plannner would target all of his most efficient weapons 
in this manner. In other words, the presence of the other two elements of the deterrent 
must be considered, as well as other potential targets that must be struck. The SALT 
agreement makes it even less likely that the Soviet planners would use their SALT-constrained 
forces to attack only one or two elements of a comprehensive target system. 
FLEXIBILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS 
Even though the advocates of a blue-water strategy focus their attention only on the 
vulnerability aspects of land-based ICBM's and bombers, we should not neglect the other 
characteristics that are essential to deterrence. Not only must our strategic forces 
survive, they must be effectively employed. Furthermore, they must possess the flexibility 
to permit their employment across the spectrum of nuclear warfare. The SALT agreements have 
given tacit recognition to the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union are now in 
a pOSition of parity with respect to strategic forces. The parity position has given rise 
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to the President's use of 'sufficiency' in prescribing our planning goals for strategic 
forces. It has also led to the statement by the President that he must have strategic 
options other than simple 'assured destruction.' The President has said: 
'A simple 'assured destruction' doctrine does not meet our present requirements for 
or _ -, ~ 
a flexible range of strategic options. No President should be left with only one strategic 
course of action, particularly that of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians 
and facilities.' ' 
How can this flexibility and range of options be provided? An obvious requirement is 
to insure that we have the command and control and communications systems ' to permit carefully 
controlled employment of parts or all of our strategic forces. A second requirement is 
that these forces be capable of attacking a wide variety of targets, both hard and soft, 
minimizing collateral damage to population and civilian facilities when required. 
Now, what is the impact of SALT on these requirements? First, since the ABM Treaty 
precludes an area ABM defense, fewer of our offensive warheads will be required to penetrate 
and neutralize that defense. This means that a greater number of our weapons could be 
targeted against other targets, providing greater flexibility of employment. How does this 
consideration affect the 'blue-water' options? The bombers with their recall, strike 
assessment, and reconsitution capability, provide the greatest flexibility. However, one 
drawback is the longer time they require to reach their targets. For attacking time-
sensitive targets, then, missiles must be used. The Minuteman systems, because of their 
accuracy and yield combinations, have greater employment flexibility than do the submarine-
launched ballistic missiles. An interesting aspect of the ABM Treaty is its effect on 
the employment of the Poseidon, with its many MIRV's, was specifically developed to 
penetrate a sophisticated Soviet ABM defense, relying upon the exhaustion of interceptors 
rather than upon penetration aids. Neither our current SLBM's nor our ICBM's were designed 
to have a hard target kill capability, as the Chairman told a Congressional Committee last 
year. For this purpose, the manned bomber remains preeminent. 
The survivable submarine-launched systems can be withheld and retargeted. They thus 
provide flexibility to withhold a retaliatory decision until the nature of the attack can 
be fully assessed. This flexibility depends upon equally survivable command, control, 
and communications. For a carefully controlled strategic response, reliable communications 
are essential. Since the ballistic missile submarine's strong point is invulnerability, 
which is dependent on keeping its location unknown, submarine-to-shore communications are 
difficult. Exposure of a communications antenna on or near the surface could give away the 
submarine's position. An ELF (extremely low frequency) system is being developed to 
communicate with submarines while they are submerged at operating depth. However, this 
would be a low data-rate system. A satellite communications system under development may 
provide better two-way communications with our submarines, but once again it may be 
necessary to expose an antenna, with the possible compromise of location. 
This is not to say that we should adopt an 'anti-blue-water' strategy and retire this 
portion of our deterrent. The SLBM's provide a large number of warheads, which currently 
gives the United States a numerical superiority in warheads, offsetting the Soviet advantage 
in delivery vehicles and megatonnage. In addition, at the present time, the SLBM's 
provide a survivable retaliatory force that enforces the overall viability of our strategic 
force mix. However, neither should we consider retiring our bomber or Minuteman forces. 
As we have seen, each has its strong points, and all are essential. The SALT agreements 
have done nothing to change that." 
